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INTRODUCTION
In late 2005 and early 2006, top executives of broadband providers indicated that they plan to charge a fee to Internet application
companies like Google, Yahoo!, and Vonage, for access to consumers’
homes through new “managed and secure” fiberoptic networks. Multiple broadband providers have expressed support for the plan to
charge Internet application companies for assured fast and priority
1
delivery over the Internet. Broadband providers assure consumers
that they will not block their networks from Internet application companies that do not pay the access fee. However, in an age where more
and more applications—such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
music and video delivery, and online gaming—are time sensitive, the
inability to pay such a fee and the subsequent penalty of slower delivery may effectively block an Internet application company from providing content.
Broadband providers argue that they made an investment in cable
and DSL infrastructure and that Internet application companies are
2
free riding on their “pipes.” On the other hand, Internet application
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See Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a Battle Over Internet
Fees: Content Providers May Face Charges for Fast Access; Billing the Consumer Twice?, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at A1 (reporting on BellSouth’s negotiations with Movielink to
“guarantee fast content delivery over the Internet,” and on AT&T and Verizon’s support of such a fee system).
2
Networks are becoming increasingly crowded and network operators are “trying
to prioritize Internet traffic to meet increasing demand” for time-sensitive applica-
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companies contend that the customer is already paying for the bandwidth and that broadband providers are using their power in the local
high speed Internet access market to extort fees from application
3
companies.
Framing the current debate is the principle of “network neutrality” (NN), which generally holds that Internet data packets should
move nondiscriminatorily (that is, without restrictions or limitations
imposed by a broadband provider). If a “pay-to-play” policy for high
speed Internet is adopted, there is an enormous risk that end-to-end
4
(e2e) innovation, one of the great benefits of the Internet, will be
swallowed into a centralized system of protocols determining which
Internet applications receive priority and, thus, enhanced exposure to
users.
This Comment focuses on one Internet application that will be directly affected by the proposed broadband pricing policy: Voice over
Internet Protocol. Although not a new concept, VoIP has begun to
proliferate only during the last few years. Internet companies such as
Vonage have used the technology to substantially reduce the cost of

tions. Id. SBC Chairman Edward E. Whitacre Jr. contends that broadband providers
have spent large amounts of capital—and will spend an additional $4 billion—on laying fiberoptic networks and that in order to obtain a return on their investment,
Internet application companies will have to “‘pay for the portion they’re using.’” Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at D1; see
also Online Extra: At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope”, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm?chan=gl
(quoting Whitacre’s comment that “the cable companies have made an investment
and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes for free
is nuts!”).
3
Vonage Chairman Jeffrey Citron compares the attitude of SBC to “UPS demanding [that] the sender and the recipient of a package both pay for delivery.” Mohammed, supra note 2, at D1 (paraphrasing Citron’s comments). He argues that it is “‘ludicrous’” for any broadband provider to “‘get paid twice on the same service.’” Id.
(quoting Citron); see also Searcey & Schatz, supra note 1, at A1 (reporting that
Vonage’s Citron believes that the system will ultimately cause the consumer to pay
twice for broadband access). Additionally, Paul Misener, Amazon.com’s Vice President
for Global Public Policy, argues that, since most consumers have limited choices for
broadband Internet access, broadband providers have “‘if not monopoly, then duopoly’” power. Mohammed, supra note 2 (quoting Misener).
4
The e2e principle is a theory of innovation that “rejects centralized, planned innovation, and holds that the greatest rate of technological development is driven by
delegating decisional authority to the decentralized ‘ends’ of any network.” Tim Wu,
The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 74 (2004).
The principle results from the fact that “the ‘ends’ of the network are numerous, or
nearly unlimited, and delegating authority to the ends opens the door to more approaches to a given technological challenge.” Id.
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5

telephone service for consumers. Many broadband providers have
recently started to offer VoIP services themselves, including Verizon’s
6
VoiceWing, AT&T’s CallVantage, and Comcast’s Digital Voice. However, as a result of broadband providers’ control over the last mile of
the network, every VoIP competitor will have to pay a surcharge in order to ensure timely delivery of the information packets necessary for
VoIP to function. As early as March 2004, market analysts predicted
that Vonage would be driven from the market by this anticompetitive
pay-to-play system:
It may seem like a dodgy competitive tactic, but broadband network operators could slow down Vonage’s service. As subscribers increase their
use of latency sensitive and graphic-rich IP traffic, broadband providers
could give network precedence to their own revenue-generating services.
Unless Vonage pays fees to the network provider, there is no reason the
7
operator should not make the service a lower priority on the network.

Thus, broadband providers’ VoIP services will always maintain a significant competitive advantage over non-broadband VoIP services, not
because of the merits of their services, but because of the additional
fee they can require competitors to pay.
This Comment argues that the pay-to-play tactics proposed by
broadband providers have significant anticompetitive effects that may
violate United States antitrust laws under the Sherman Act. Some
commentators suggest that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should regulate the
Internet using an “antitrust-like” approach, in order to avoid competitive harms before they occur. Although this approach has strong
merit and could seamlessly incorporate the principles articulated in
this Comment, the current regulatory policy remains hands-off. Thus,
in the time period between the present deregulation of the broadband market and the competitive ideal of the future, there is a need
for an interim solution to protect innovation. I argue that a court-

5

Traditional telephone services charge customers primarily based on the duration
of the call and on the distance between the call participants. The Meaning of Free Speech,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, at 69, 70. However, these factors “are simply irrelevant with VoIP.” Id.
6
Martin Perez, Study: VoIP Call Quality Getting a Bit Better, VOIP-NEWS, Sept. 22,
2006, http://www.voip-news.com/news/study-quality-cable-092206 (describing the results of a VoIP provider call-quality study including Verizon, AT&T, and Comcast).
7
Daniel Klein, Why Vonage Is Just a Fad, ZDNET, May 19, 2004, http://
www.techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/Why_Vonage_Just_Fad.html.
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enforced, case-by-case antitrust framework would provide that solution, and that it is thus important today to articulate such liability.
Part I of this Comment explains how time-sensitive applications
such as VoIP work and what makes them vulnerable to a pay-to-play
priority distribution system. Part II describes the potential effects that
a pay-to-play system would have on innovation in the application markets. Part III discusses three potential government responses to the
pay-to-play system. Finally, Part IV examines the antitrust doctrines
that a pay-to-play system might violate.
I. HOW TIME-SENSITIVE APPLICATIONS WORK: WHAT IS VOIP?
As the name VoIP expresses, the technology “transmits voice over
8
the Internet in the form of Internet protocol.”
Other Internet
transmissions, including e-mail, video, and Web surfing, use similar
9
transmission protocols. VoIP converts a user’s voice into digital bits
10
and organizes them into thousands of “packets.” Each voice packet
is “individually addressed [to the intended recipient] and sent over
11
[the] physical networks” of broadband providers. However, unlike
traditional public, switched telephone networks, in which a voice
transmission takes a “‘permanent or exclusive’ path from its sender to
its recipient,” Internet routers “read packet addresses individually and
12
decide the optimal path of transmission for each packet.” Thus, despite the perceived “constancy” of a fixed connection between the
conversing individuals, a VoIP transmission allows the voice packets to
13
take a variety of routes to the same final destination. Upon arrival of
the individual voice packets, the participant’s computer aggregates
14
and reassembles them into a coherent conversation. Through this
method of transmission, “VoIP can carry significantly more informa-

8

Jared S. Dinkes, Note, Rethinking the Revolution: Competitive Telephony in a Voice
over Internet Protocol Era, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 833, 840 (2005).
9
Id. (“[VoIP’s] transmission is essentially no different from other forms of information transmitted over the internet . . . .”).
10
Id.
11
Id. The physical networks “may be composed of copper, fiber, coaxial cable, or
wireless facilities.” Id.
12
Id. at 841. If a portion of a network is malfunctioning, routers are able to recognize the disturbance and “seek an alternate path for the packets to travel.” Id.
13
Id. at 840-41.
14
Id. at 841.
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tion in a more efficient manner than analog transmission” over fixed
15
telephone lines.
What differentiates VoIP from traditional Internet applications,
such as e-mail and instant messaging, is the time-sensitive nature of
packet delivery. When sending and receiving an e-mail, a one-second
delay of a digital packet is usually undetectable by the user. However,
when using the Internet to transmit voice or video, even a tenth-of-a16
second delay could destroy the usefulness of the application. Thus,
with the increased use of the Internet for voice communication, video
and music downloading, and gaming, there is considerable consumer
17
demand for reliable and speedy packet delivery. To meet this in18
creased demand, broadband providers are upgrading their networks.
II. PAY-TO-PLAY: EFFECTS ON INNOVATION
To date, broadband providers have generated income streams directly from consumers. Many providers price discriminate between
19
residential and commercial users of their networks. In addition, in
order to ensure network quality and speed, providers often limit con20
21
sumer bandwidth or base their charges on bandwidth usage. Al-

15

Id.
See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 148 (2003) (stating that a delay of a few milliseconds “certainly
matters for applications that want to carry voice or video”). Although invented in the
early 1990s, VoIP was not a viable technology during the “narrow band” dial-up era of
the Internet. In 2004, many engineers still incorrectly believed that the technology
could not be supported on the present broadband networks. See Wu, supra note 4, at
71-72 (discussing the various reasons for the delay of widespread consumer use of
VoIP).
17
See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-To-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 23, 35 (2004) (noting that “[b]andwidth-hungry applications . . . are placing
increasing pressure on network capacity”).
18
In addition to upgrading their networks to meet the growing demand for timesensitive applications, many broadband providers are considering the use of “‘policybased routers,’ which can discriminate among packets and assign them different levels
of priority, depending on the source of the packet or the nature of the application being run.” Id. at 36. For a discussion of the policy issues behind “policy-based routers,”
see infra Part II.B.1.
19
See Searcey & Schatz, supra note 1 (“Cable and phone companies have already
started offering multitiered pricing of broadband for consumers.”).
20
See Wu, supra note 16, at 158-62 (outlining broadband usage restrictions); Searcey & Schatz, supra note 1 (describing some cable companies’ intentions to prevent
“broadband customers from using too much bandwidth”).
16
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though commentators disagree about whether consumer pricing
based on bandwidth usage protects the open nature of the Internet
22
and permits innovation on the “ends” of the network, differing pricing levels—residential as opposed to commercial—based on band23
width usage has been the industry norm. However, recent pay-toplay musings by broadband providers violate many of the principles of
NN and present serious risks, including stifling innovation.
A. Network Neutrality Promotes Innovation
Generally, the principle underlying NN focuses on the importance of protecting the ability of Internet users to access Web content
and to use Internet applications without limitation or restriction by
broadband providers. Academic promoters of the NN principle, like
Tim Wu, seek to “preserv[e] a Darwinian competition among every
24
conceivable use of the Internet so that . . . only the best survive.” Although commentators disagree on the best method of preserving
25
NN—most notably on the “dumb” versus “smart” pipe debate —most,
if not all, agree that preserving Internet innovation as the basis of
26
“economic growth” is a principal goal. Both sides of the debate view
21

See Yoo, supra note 17, at 36 (“[M]any last-mile providers either forbid end users
to use bandwidth-intensive applications . . . or instead require that they pay higher
charges before doing so.”).
22
Compare id. at 27-28 (suggesting that broadband providers could “differentiate”
their networks to “serv[e] the needs” of different subgroups, with “one optimizing its
network for conventional Internet applications such as e-mail and website access, another incorporating security features to facilitate e-commerce, [and] a third employing
routers that prioritize packets in the manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applications”), with Wu, supra note 16, at 152-53 (arguing that, although “mainstream antitrust
analysis has come to see [it] as generally uncontentious,” price discrimination may
have unfortunate, “dynamic consequences for the competitive development of new
applications”).
23
See Wu, supra note 16, at 160-61 (describing the limitations broadband providers
place on “commercial use” of “residential broadband connections”).
24
Id. at 142.
25
“Openists,” those in favor of a “dumb pipe,” believe that innovation and “technological development” are driven by decentralizing authority and delegating it to the
“ends” of the network. Wu, supra note 4, at 74. They see “fast and reliable connection[s]” as a service that “must not discriminate as between uses, users, or content.” Id.
at 72-73. “Deregulationists,” those in favor of a “smart pipe,” have a contrasting view of
“media convergence” onto a single “smart pipe” that has the ability to distinguish between those applications that are time sensitive and those that are not. Id. at 75-76.
They believe that the enormous incentives to provide bundled media and communications will drive innovation and growth. Id. at 76-77.
26
See id. at 80 (discussing the “Shared Economic Faiths” of the two principal NN
approaches).
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innovation, including “new companies, new services, and new products,” and “not price competition,” as the “principle driver of eco27
nomic growth” and increased efficiency.
In order to protect such innovation, proposed NN rules create
rights for Internet users. For example, a recently proposed rule reads:
(b) General Right of Unrestricted Network Usage. Broadband Users have the
right to use their Internet connection in ways which [are] not unlawful
or harmful to the network. Accordingly neither Broadband Operators
nor the Federal Communications Commission shall impose restrictions
on the use of an Internet connection except as necessary to: [prevent
28
uses illegal under statute or uses harmful to the network].
29

In August 2005, the FCC adopted four NN principles based on
the fundamental proposition “that consumers should be able to use
their broadband internet access service to access any content on the
30
internet.”
These proposed and adopted NN rules and principles are attempts to form a “pre-commitment rule for both government and in31
dustry . . . prevent[ing] now what may be temptations tomorrow.”
From the industry’s point of view, NN rules and principles offer significant value to broadband providers by preventing the government
“from blocking [broadband provider] entry into the application mar27

Id.
Id. at 88 (citing the latest iteration of a proposed rule that was initially submitted to the FCC in Letter from Tim Wu, Associate Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law &
Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marleen H. Dorth, Sec’y, FCC
(Aug. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from Wu & Lessig], available at http://www.freepress.net/
docs/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf.
29
For a list of these four principles, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
Prior to the official adoption of these principles, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell had articulated and published his own view of the four freedoms to which all Internet users are entitled. Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles
for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004) (enumerating the
four “Internet Freedoms”: (1) “freedom to access content,” (2) “freedom to use applications,” (3) “freedom to attach personal devices,” and (4) “freedom to obtain service
plan information”).
30
Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy
Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.lasarletter.com/2005/docs/
martin_netneutrality.pdf; see also Policy Statement, In re Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988
(F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (indicating that “broadband networks [should be] widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers”). Congress is considering a
bill that would give the FCC “exclusive authority to adjudicate any complaint alleging a
violation of the broadband policy statement” of August 5, 2005. H.R. 5252, 109th
Cong. § 201 (2006).
31
Wu, supra note 4, at 89 (emphasis added).
28
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32

ket,” and thus protecting broadband providers’ ability to offer “com33
petitive, vertically integrated applications themselves.”
From the
government’s point of view, the NN rules and principles protect market entry by “creat[ing] a structural bias that favors entry of any
34
player . . . into the market for consumer usage of the Internet.”
Fundamentally, the NN rules and principles “are designed to
35
make the Vonage story repeat itself.” Vonage is an archetype of a
new company driving innovation. In the 1990s, VoIP was often discussed within the broadband community and the media, though it was
36
seldom deployed.
When broadband providers were asked when
VoIP would be available to the general consuming public, “the answer
37
was always ‘not quite yet.’” Those questioning the viability of VoIP
argued that, “without substantial network improvements,” the consuming American public would refuse to purchase such an “inconsis38
tent” technology. Both DSL and cable providers were reluctant to
39
take significant steps toward a VoIP rollout. DSL providers, the most
prominent of which were Bell companies, feared “cannibaliz[ing] the
40
industry’s most profitable [phone] service,” and cable broadband
41
providers likely feared sparking a DSL entry into “residential video.”
In 2003, however, instead of cooperating with the reluctant
broadband providers, Vonage sold VoIP service straight to consum42
ers.
By selling a phone that plugged into the network, Vonage
avoided broadband providers altogether and charged “a fraction of”
43
the traditional telephone network cost. During a time of uncertainty

32

Id. “If the users have the right to access lawful applications and content, that
includes those provided by the operator itself.” Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. (emphasis added).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 71.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 71-72.
39
See CHARLES H. FERGUSON, BROOKINGS INST., POLICY BRIEF #105: THE U.S.
BROADBAND PROBLEM 1, 5 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he slow pace of improvement in
broadband services is not surprising,” since “[n]either industry would logically be interested in provoking highly dynamic competition in open-architecture, high-speed,
and/or symmetric broadband services to either businesses or homes”).
40
Wu, supra note 4, at 72.
41
FERGUSON, supra note 39, at 5.
42
Wu, supra note 4, at 72. By September 2005, Vonage had over one million U.S.
customers. Press Release, Vonage, Vonage Says, “Thanks a Million America” (Sept. 12,
2005), http://www.vonage.com/media/pdf/pr_09_12_05.pdf.
43
Wu, supra note 4, at 72.
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about the future of VoIP, Vonage “offered what everyone said no one
44
would buy.” Without a company like Vonage to drive innovation,
“VoIP would have arrived on the carrier’s schedule: later or perhaps
45
never.”
The “structural bias” of the Internet, which currently favors market
46
entry, made the Vonage story possible. Even if Vonage is eventually
pushed out of the market as a result of competition—as many predict
47
it will be —it will have succeeded in moving the entire network for48
ward by bringing innovation to market.
B. Pay-To-Play Destroys Network Neutrality
A pay-to-play policy contravenes both the NN rules and the FCC
principles and would act as a preclusive barrier to new and innovative
Internet application companies.
1. The Shift from Nondiscriminatory Protocols
to Discriminatory “Smart Pipes”
First, in order to make a pay-to-play policy policeable, broadband
providers must continue their departure from the nondiscriminatory
49
and largely anonymous TCP/IP framework to “smart pipes” with the
ability to identify and discriminate among packets based on their
sources. “Openists,” who believe that broadband networks “should be
kept ‘dumb’ and should focus solely on passing along packets as
quickly as possible,” are reluctant to accept such a departure from
50
TCP/IP.
Pragmatists like Adam Thierer recognize the potential competitive
dangers of discriminatory broadband networks, but also identify sev-

44

Id.
Id.
46
Wu, supra note 4, at 89. As the CEOs of Google, Microsoft, Intel, and several
other major technology companies put it, “‘innovation without permission’ represents
‘the essence of the Internet.’” ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., A “THIRD WAY” ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY 5 (2006),
http://itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf.
47
See infra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that it is unlikely that independent providers will continue to dominate the VoIP market).
48
Wu, supra note 4, at 89.
49
TCP/IP “routes all packets in a nondiscriminatory (i.e., first come, first served)
manner without regard to the packet’s content, point of origin, or associated application.” Yoo, supra note 17, at 33.
50
Id. at 41.
45
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eral “smart pipe” benefits that could ultimately improve the quality
51
and efficiency of networks.
Those benefits include quality-service
52
53
assurances, network integrity, increased security, and the ability to
54
meet the demands of law enforcement.
The introduction of technology capable of discrimination must be
undertaken with care. Along with the ability to “discriminate among
packets” comes the power to “assign them different levels of priority,
depending on the source of the packet or the nature of the applica55
tion being run.” Internet application companies fear that misuse of
56
this power would stifle rival competition and innovative applications.
Actions taken under the guise of preserving “quality service” may actually be anticompetitive tactics to slow down rival applications. Additionally, since a broadband provider’s network control would be proprietary, “degrading service by introducing delays or dropping
57
occasional calls [would be] difficult to prove.”
Therefore, largely

51

See Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
275, 278, 292-96 (2005) (arguing that “‘openness’ and (semi-)dumb pipes will likely
prevail naturally in the marketplace”).
52
Seeking “to ensure steady traffic flows” by either “curb[ing] excessive bandwidth usage by some users, or at least price discriminat[ing] to encourage bandwidth
conservation” would benefit the entire network. See id. at 296 (describing these approaches).
53
Many Internet “end users have become increasingly frustrated by intrusions
thrust upon them by other end users.” Yoo, supra note 17, at 36-37. Forms of intrusion, “such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses . . . and programs that mine cookies for
private information,” threaten network integrity. Id. at 37 (detailing various “malicious” intrusions on Internet usage and the reactions of consumers). Subscribers expect and demand that their broadband provider take protective measures “to prevent
viruses or block excessive Spam.” Thierer, supra note 51, at 296.
54
Under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), law
enforcement agencies must have the ability to place wiretaps on Internet phone calls.
See Yoo, supra note 17, at 37 (“CALEA . . . requires that all telecommunications carriers
configure their networks in a way that permits law enforcement . . . to place wiretaps
on telephone calls.”).
55
Id. at 36.
56
For example, in November 2004, Nuvio Corporation, a small VoIP provider based
in Kansas City, filed a request with the FCC to “prohibit[] providers of broadband connections . . . from degrading third-party offerings in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage.” Alan Breznick, VoIP Provider Presses FCC To Block Broadband Discrimination, CABLE DIGITAL NEWS, Nov. 1, 2004 (on file with author); see also Donny Jackson, Nuvio Seeks
Non-discriminatory Broadband for VoIP, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2004,
http://telephonyonline.com/broadband/web/telecom_nuvio_seeks_nondiscriminatory.
57
Jonathan Krim, Phone Company Settles in Blocking of Internet Calls, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 2005, at E2 (citing Nuvio CEO Jason P. Talley).
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undetectable discriminatory protocols give broadband providers the
power to interrupt rivals’ time-sensitive applications.
Thus, although the increased intelligence of networks and “semismart pipes” may increase network efficiency and safety, the shift away
from an anonymous and nondiscriminatory network may also create
significant competitive dangers. Specifically, in an anticompetitive
environment in which broadband providers control the reliability and
consistency of a rival’s application, there will be disincentives for new
companies to create innovative applications.
2. The Inability of Innovators To Pay
Pay-to-play policies have an additional, even more obvious, risk to
potential Internet innovators: new start-up companies with innovative
applications might not be able to afford the premium for assured
packet delivery. Although broadband providers claim they will not
become “Internet gatekeepers” because they will not technically block
58
consumer access to applications, a pay-to-play policy would effectively
block any Internet company whose application requires time-sensitive
59
packet delivery.
Particularly since Internet application companies
already must pay broadband providers large fees for bandwidth, payment of an additional fee “would be very damaging” for many start-up
60
companies. In addition, venture capitalists would find “fewer new
businesses worthy of investment if the phone and cable companies are
61
allowed to favor one business over another.”
A pay-to-play system would create significant barriers to entry for
future time-sensitive applications, thus foreclosing many innovative

58

See Mohammed, supra note 2 (quoting SBC spokesman Michael Balmoris as saying that “SBC has not and will not block or limit access to lawful content or applications on the Internet”).
59
Thus, current video, voice, or music applications would be affected by the payto-play policy. Additionally, there would be a chilling effect on the incentive to research and develop innovations like Internet computing—running all PC functions on
a central processor over the Internet—if packets could not be be guaranteed timely
delivery without payment.
60
Internet Debate: Preserving User Parity (Nat’l Pub. Radio Broadcast Apr. 25, 2006)
(comments of Josh Felser, CEO of Grouper.com); see also ATKINSON & WEISER, supra
note 46, at 5 (recognizing that “an Internet where an innovator has to ask permission
(and pay potentially significant fees) before deploying a new technology threatens the
Internet’s golden goose of allowing innovation over an open platform”).
61
Internet Debate, supra note 60 (citing the concerns of Gary Morganthaler, general
partner in the venture capital firm Morganthaler Ventures).
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Internet application companies from competing with broadband providers on the merits of their services.
3. The Result: Disincentive To Innovate
The combination of a discriminatory protocol and a barrier to entry for time-sensitive applications would create a potentially dangerous
result: innovators on the “ends” of the network might choose not to
develop new applications.
A pay-to-play system would create an enormous disincentive to a
rational innovator or venture capitalist who is deciding whether to develop or fund a new Internet application. Lawrence Lessig and Tim
Wu suggest that even comments by broadband providers’ top executives about the possibility of implementing a pay-to-play system can
have a detrimental effect on innovation: “If the innovation is likely to
excite an incentive to discrimination, and such discrimination could
occur, then the mere potential imposes a burden on innovation today
whether or not there is discrimination now. The possibility of dis62
crimination in the future dampens the incentives to invest today.”
Many of the participants in the present pay-to-play debate focus
too narrowly on protecting independent VoIP providers from bankruptcy. However, it is likely that Vonage and other independent VoIP
companies will not survive competition with the large broadband pro63
viders.
The crucial element to protect in this debate is Vonage’s role as
an innovation catalyst, a company that succeeded in moving the entire
network forward. Vonage’s role in promoting innovation must be replicable by others in the future. However, a pay-to-play policy for assured delivery of time-sensitive packets would inhibit the potential for
innovation provided by a more neutral network model. Thus, future
innovations would be stifled long before they could reach the market.
62

Letter from Wu & Lessig, supra note 28, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
Although independent VoIP companies have created a significant consumer
base due to their first-mover advantage, “it is unlikely that they will retain their dominant market share because the traditional telecom industry leaders and ISPs have
more resources and brand power.” Sunny Lu, Cellco Partnership v. FCC & Vonage
Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Comm’n: VoIP’s Shifting Legal and Political
Landscape, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 859, 867 (2005). In addition, cable broadband providers will be able to offer the “‘triple play’ of broadband Internet connection, cable
[television] and now VoIP,” providing the consumer with the convenience of having
“one provider and paying one bill.” R. Alex DuFour, Voice over Internet Protocol: Ending
Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471, 476 (2005).
63
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III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE PAY-TO-PLAY PROBLEM
Part II examined the dangers that a pay-to-play system poses to
Internet innovation. This Part focuses on the potential responses
from government and individuals.
A. Regulation: Broadband as an “Information Service”
Traditionally, telecommunications have been heavily regulated by
64
the FCC. But in an attempt to increase competition in the provision
of broadband services, the FCC has taken a “lighter regulatory
65
touch.” Thus, it is likely that the FCC will not react to remedy the
potential harms of a pay-to-play system.
In March 2002, the FCC concluded that cable broadband service
66
is an “information service,” and not a “telecommunications service,”
and thus is exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation under
67
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. In August 2005, the
FCC reclassified the provision of DSL broadband as an “information
68
service” as well.
On the same day as the DSL reclassification, the FCC adopted
four principles in order “[t]o encourage broadband deployment and

64

See Dinkes, supra note 8, at 844-57 (providing a brief history of regulation of traditional public switched telephone networks).
65
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,856 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report order and notice of
proposed rulemaking); see also Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,222 (Oct. 17, 2005) (final rule) (removing many previous regulatory impediments).
66
Press Release, FCC, FCC Classifies Cable Modem Service as “Information Service” (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-220835A1.pdf. The FCC’s decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688
(2005).
67
See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46) (2000) (defining “information service” and “telecommunications service,” the latter of which is subject to mandatory Title II regulation).
68
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,223; see also Marguerite Reardon, FCC Changes DSL Classification,
CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 5, 2005, http://news.com.com/FCC+changes+DSL+classification/
2100-1034_3-5820713.html (describing the reclassification process). Even though neither cable nor DSL broadband providers are subject to mandatory Title II regulation,
the FCC “has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications.” Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161).
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preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the
69
public Internet”:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice . . . (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement . . . (3)
consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do
not harm the network . . . (4) consumers are entitled to competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and con70
tent providers.

However, FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin made it clear that the
policy statements “do not establish rules nor are they enforceable
71
documents.” In statements to the press, Martin has been noncommittal toward enforcing the “four principles” against broadband pro72
viders who implement a pay-to-play policy.
The primary purpose of relieving both cable and DSL providers
from the mandatory Title II regulation is to increase competition be73
tween the two platforms on a level playing field. In addition, the
FCC hopes to spur investment in other competing broadband tech74
nologies. If a pay-to-play policy helps to encourage market entry by

69

Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (policy statement).
70
Id.
71
Press Release, supra note 30. On June 8, 2006, the United States House of Representatives passed the Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement
(COPE) Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006), which has yet to be approved by the Senate. The COPE Act would amend Title VII of the Communications
Act of 1934 and give the FCC the authority to “adjudicate any complaint alleging a violation of the broadband policy statement and the principles incorporated therein . . . .”
Id. However, outside of the adjudication of complaints, the FCC would not have authority to “adopt or implement rules or regulations regarding enforcement of the
broadband policy statement and principles incorporated therein . . . .” Id.
72
See Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC, Answers to Reporters’ Questions at the American Enterprise Institute (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/
agencies/fcc/networkneutrality/20060208.asp (“[T]he Commission . . . has adopted
some network neutrality rules that address . . . some [of the] principles . . . . [T]he issue of whether or not the carriers can charge any of the content providers . . . has
come up recently . . . . [T]he Commission is still trying to evaluate what that is . . . . I
think that the marketplace is still evolving . . . .”).
73
See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. at 14,987 (describing the “principle” that “consumers are entitled to competition among network providers”).
74
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,884 (F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (describing the importance of “the threat of competition
from other forms of broadband Internet access, whether satellite, fixed or mobile wire-
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increasing the possible rewards of competing in the broadband provider market, it is reasonable to assume that the FCC will likely decide
75
not to intervene.
Alternatively, Raymond Gifford, President and Senior Fellow of
the Progress and Freedom Foundation, has suggested that the FTC
76
should “supervise broadband services.” Gifford argues that, under
“the state of the law right now,” the FTC has the power and is in a
strong position to protect the nation’s broadband market and its con77
sumers.
Gifford focuses on three factors that allow the FTC to balance the
need for heightened “vigilance” in the broadband market against the
need for “pricing freedom to recover fixed costs” in order to “encour78
age investment” in the broadband market. First, he emphasizes that
79
the FTC is “dedicated to competition policy and consumer welfare.”
Thus, any FTC “intervention” would have to be based on “claims of
80
real harm, not competitive disadvantage.” Second, Gifford reasons
that, “as an agency of general jurisdiction, the FTC is less prone to” a
81
specific industry’s influence. Since the FTC has regulatory authority
across the entire U.S. economy, cable and DSL providers would find
82
it more difficult to “‘capture’ the FTC’s regulatory agenda.” Third,
he argues that the FTC would also be the appropriate broadband
83
regulator because it is “largely an enforcement agency.”
It carries

less, or a yet-to-be-realized alternative” to “stimulate further deployment of broadband
infrastructure”).
75
See Drew Clark, FCC Chief Opens Door to Tiered, High Speed Internet, TECH. DAILY, Jan.
6, 2006, http://www.njtelecomupdate.com/lenya/telco/live/tbFBRB1136842420157.html
(quoting FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s prediction that the FCC will continue to try to
“move from ‘legacy regulations,’” of monopolies to a market that emphasizes competition).
76
Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Raymond
L. Gifford), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/060616gifford_com.pdf.
77
Id. The change in a broadband provider’s classification—from a common carrier to an information service—has significant effects on the FTC’s jurisdiction over
broadband providers. After the reclassification of broadband, “the statutory exclusion
of common carriers from FTC jurisdiction is not applicable.” Id. The FTC currently
“has jurisdiction within its competition policy and consumer protection mandates.” Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. Gifford claims that the FTC will be “deferential to markets absent clear
harm to consumer welfare.” Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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out its mission by investigating and bringing actions for “specifically
84
alleged and proven harms to consumer welfare.” This type of narrow “[a]fter-the-fact regulation” has considerable advantages over the
potentially overbroad “before-the-fact rulemaking regulation” or legis85
lation.
Currently, the FTC has formed an Internet Access Task Force in
86
order to “develop . . . expertise in the area of Internet access.” Deborah Platt Majoras, current Chairman of the FTC, has committed to
coordinating with the FCC and recognizes that “the FCC’s mandate
87
goes beyond competition and consumer protection.” As described
above, the FCC, in an effort to encourage broadband deployment, has
reduced regulatory constraints on broadband providers. Thus, where
the jurisdictions of the FCC and the FTC intersect, the FTC may likely
defer to the “lighter-touch” policy employed by the FCC.
B. Legislation Adopting Neutrality Principles
In the absence of a committed FCC policy toward neutrality, some
members of Congress have sought to impose such a policy through
legislation. Since the spring of 2006, the NN debate has been publi88
cized on a national scale, with both telecommunications and
89
e-commerce companies spending millions to influence Congress.
Both houses of Congress have held hearings on NN and listened
to the viewpoints of academics, scientists, engineers, businesspeople,
90
and even an “Internet Evangelist.” In a hearing before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Lawrence

84

Id.
Id.
86
Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, FTC, The Federal Trade Commission in the
Online World: Promoting Competition and Protecting Consumers, Remarks at the
Progress and Freedom Foundation’s Aspen Summit 12 (Aug. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060821ppfaspenfinal.pdf.
87
Id. at 19-20.
88
See Kim Hart & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Tech Faceoff: Net Neutrality, in the Eye of the
Beholder; Stark Contrasts in the Debate over the Future of the Internet, WASH. POST, July 2,
2006, at F4 (describing the national debate over NN).
89
See Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Republicans Defeat Net Neutrality Proposal, CNET
NEWS.COM, Apr. 5, 2006, http://news.com.com/Republicans+defeat+Net+neutrality+proposal/
2100-1028_3-6058223.html (explaining that lobbying has grown around the NN debate).
90
See Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Vinton Cerf, “Vice
President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.”).
85
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Lessig proposed that Congress “ratify” former FCC Chairman Powell’s
91
four “Internet Freedoms,” with an additional restriction upon pay-to92
play “access-tiering.” On June 28, 2006, though, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation rejected an NN
amendment that would have disallowed pay-to-play systems based on
93
network content. Under the defeated legislation, for example, Comcast would not have been able to charge Google Video for assured delivery of its time-sensitive packets. On the other hand, the legislation
would have given broadband providers the option to offer “consumertiered” services. Broadband providers would have been able to charge
consumers based on either “bandwidth guarantees” or “service guar94
antees.” With the option to charge for different levels of broadband
use, broadband providers would have retained their incentives to
build better broadband services and increase their capacity, even if
the proposed amendment had not been defeated.
Those opposing the NN legislation proposed by members of Congress and Lessig fear the “one size fits all” approach, emphasizing that
in the absence of an actual danger, “prophylactic” legislation “may do
95
more harm than good.” In a continuing period of growth in which
even the most experienced businesses cannot accurately predict mar96
ket outcomes, critics like Christopher Yoo argue that there is “little
91

See supra note 29.
See Hearing, supra note 90, at 55 (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of
Law, Stanford Law School).
93
See Grant Gross, Senate Panel Rejects Net Neutrality in Tie Vote: Stevens: Supporters
Should ‘Build Their Own Network’, COMPUTERWORLD, June 28, 2006, http://
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9001506
(describing the amendment as “a proposal that would have required broadband providers to give their competitors the same speeds and quality of service as they give to
themselves or their partners”); Kim Hart & Sara Kehaulani Goo, ‘Net Neutrality’ Amendment Rejected; Senate Committee Approves Telecom Bill, but Republicans May Need More Votes,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at D5 (reporting that a “proposal to prevent Internet service providers from charging Web firms more for faster service to consumers” failed to
obtain enough votes from the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee).
94
Hearing, supra note 90, at 58 (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), available at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/Lessig_Testimony.2.pdf.
A “bandwidth guarantee” is an assurance of a minimum level of speed, while a “service
guarantee” is an assurance that a certain service (such as video, voice, or gaming)
would work properly on the network. Id.
95
Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J.
1847, 1855, 1896 (2006).
96
For example, industry giant AT&T failed to appreciate the potential of the
Internet. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 32-33 (2001) (describing
AT&T’s initial reaction to the Internet).
92
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reason” to believe that a government-imposed outcome “will do any
97
better.” Thus, legislative or agency involvement “meant to forestall a
perceived danger that has not yet materialized” has a potential for be98
ing overbroad. Even though Congress’s purpose may be to protect
innovation, passing legislation that cannot adapt to changing market
99
environments may have the effect of inhibiting innovation.
C. Antitrust as a Framework for an Enforcement Mechanism
Those opposing the Lessig-type legislation often prefer a “market
power alternative” approach in which any intervention (1) is “narrowly
targeted to specific instances of market power, in terms of both geographic scope and behavioral requirements of the remedy”; and (2)
100
“incorporate[s] a rigorous competitive standard and evidentiary showing.”
The “market power alternative” approach sounds remarkably similar
to antitrust enforcement of anticompetitive monopolistic activity. By
imposing penalties and restrictions on broadband providers’ specific
anticompetitive conduct, a framework based on antitrust law would
alleviate the need for congressional legislation prescribing specific re101
quirements for competition.
Thus, an antitrust framework serves as
a pragmatic middle ground to protect Internet innovation.
The “overriding goal” of antitrust law “is to maintain public confidence in the market mechanism by deterring and punishing instances
102
of economic oppression.” In addition, a more targeted goal of anti-

97

Yoo, supra note 95, at 1897-98.
Id. at 1898.
99
See id. at 1898-99 (expressing doubts about the ability of government actors to
foster innovation).
100
Hearing, supra note 90, at 52 (testimony of Kyle D. Dixon, Federal Institute for
Regulatory Law and Economics); see also Yoo, supra note 95, at 1896-1900 (preferring a
targeted response against anticompetitive activity to broad prophylactic legislation).
101
David Farber, Professor of Computer Science and Public Policy at Carnegie
Mellon University, opposes NN legislation because he believes that sufficient mechanisms exist in current antitrust law to protect Internet application companies. Net Neutrality and the Future of the Web (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast July 24, 2006); see also Getting
a Fix on Network Neutrality, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 14, 2006, at 4, available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlecfm?articleis=1497 (describing Wharton
Professor of Business and Public Policy Gerald Faulhaber’s view that “companies are
better off filing antitrust suits to handle concerns over net favoritism”).
102
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 9-10 (2000). “Antitrust preserves and protects markets as an
alternative to more intrusive government regulation or control of the economy.” Id.
98
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103

trust is the promotion of innovation.
Monopolists, such as broadband providers, have “a reduced incentive to innovate,” and, if they do
innovate, they “may be motivated to suppress or delay commercializa104
tion.”
One treatise acknowledges that, in order “to protect its monopoly, a firm may even attempt to suppress or discourage others
105
from marketing available innovation” —the danger identified by this
Comment. The application of antitrust law in the context of Internet
applications would help protect future innovations like VoIP.
The FCC’s focus on the deregulation of the provision of broadband is meant to spur competition between DSL, cable, and alterna106
tive providers in the deployment of broadband.
Deregulation often
107
When the government moves
expands the domain of antitrust.

103

Id. at 13. Innovation includes “improving [a] product, producing it more efficiently, or perhaps replacing it with an entirely different product that outperforms the
old one.” Id.
104
Id. For example, both cable and DSL providers were well aware of VoIP as a
viable technology, although neither had sufficient incentive to commercialize the
product. See FERGUSON, supra note 39, at 4-5 (arguing that cable providers and “incumbent local exchange carriers” have a shared interest in preventing “openarchitecture broadband competition”).
105
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 13.
106
To achieve the goal of increased competition, the FCC seeks to provide incentives for developing technologies such as satellite, 3G, WiFi, and power line broadband
to enter the broadband services market. See supra note 74. After the Brand X Court’s
upholding of the FCC’s “information service” determination for cable, and the FCC’s
subsequent reclassification of DSL as an information service, see supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text, major companies such as Google began to invest heavily in alternative provider technologies. See Marguerite Reardon, Broadband’s Power-Line Push, CNET
NEWS.COM, July 11, 2005, http://news.com.com/Broadbands+power-line+push/21001034_3-5780316.html (describing Google’s post-Brand X investment in broadband
power line technology). Although increased competition looms in the future, the
DSL/cable duopoly will likely remain steadfast. See Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,884
(F.C.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (“Given
recent trends, the market penetration of cable modem and DSL broadband Internet
access services, in particular, could grow dramatically in the future.”).
107
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 775 (discussing how the deregulation of an industry may “enlarge the realm of antitrust”). In Verizon Communications,
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004), the Supreme Court
focused on “the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm” in deciding whether to apply the refusal-to-deal doctrine to an antitrust claim. The Court recognized that “[w]here [a regulatory] structure exists, the
additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be
small.” Id. But “[w]here, by contrast, ‘[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory
scheme which performs the antitrust function,’ the benefits of antitrust are worth its
sometimes considerable disadvantages.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Silver v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)).
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from regulation toward the “competitive ideal,” antitrust law can be
available if “conduct varies significantly from the competitive
108
norm.”
Some commentators who identify potential anticompetitive
109
actions by broadband providers support a case-by-case approach,
but are reluctant to support “a categorical requirement that all broadband [providers] make their networks available to all content and ap110
plications.”
This Comment concludes that, although antitrust concepts poten111
112
tially could be applied effectively by the FCC or the FTC, the
courts are currently the most effective forum for adjudicating anticompetitive acts by broadband providers. Thus, in the current environment, antitrust law should be the primary method to protect innovation and ensure that the competitive ideal is achieved in the market
for the provision of broadband services.
IV. A BROADBAND PAY-TO-PLAY POLICY WOULD
VIOLATE ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
This Part focuses on the potential antitrust violations a pay-to-play
system might encounter in an era of reduced FCC regulation of information services. The proposed pay-to-play system would have se-

108

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 775.
An anticompetitive action could be, for example, “a broadband provider
bar[ring] access to an Internet application that competes directly with its core business.” Yoo, supra note 95, at 1899.
110
Id. at 1899-1900 (arguing that “blanket” restrictions are the wrong approach to
anticompetitive behavior by broadband providers); see also supra note 101 (describing
David Farber’s belief that antitrust law is sufficient to protect Internet application
competition).
111
For a recommendation on how the FCC should regulate broadband, see ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 46. Atkinson and Weiser suggest a three-part solution to
the regulation of broadband, largely focusing on congressional empowerment of the
FCC to monitor broadband providers’ “access and usage policies” as well as to “oversee[] the use of discriminatory access arrangements to make sure that any such arrangements do not harm competition (and consumers).” Id. at 2. Atkinson and
Weiser recommend that the FCC should respond to claims using an “expedited,” “adjudicative,” “antitrust-like” approach. Id. They reason that, “[u]nder such a model, a
firm that suspected discrimination in favor of a competitor could commence a proceeding to challenge that practice and be assured of a timely response.” Id. at 13. Although “the FCC [may] arguably possess the authority today (under its ancillary jurisdiction) to implement [Atkinson and Weiser’s] model of regulation,” the “antitrustlike” approach is unlikely to be implemented without specific congressional confirmation of such authority. Id.; see also supra Part III.A (concluding that in the near future,
the FCC is likely to take a hands-off approach to broadband regulation).
112
See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
109
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vere exclusionary effects that would threaten to destroy the established competitive norm in Internet applications. By unfairly increasing rivals’ costs, broadband providers could be guilty of monopoliza113
tion, which would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
A. The Monopolization Claim Against a Pay-To-Play System
Under antitrust law, the offense of monopolization has two elements: “(1) [T]he possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a su114
perior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”
1. Monopoly Power Test
In a monopoly power analysis under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
the primary question concerns whether the defendant possesses “‘the
115
power to control prices or exclude competition.’”
Courts must first
define the relevant product and geographic markets for each case
116
presented.
Since the pay-to-play system would use broadband pro117
viders’ duopoly power in fiberoptic networks to harm competitors
113

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
115
Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956)); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 86 (“The ultimate
question concerning power is whether the defendant possesses power over price and
the power to exclude competition.”).
116
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 86-87 (describing how courts define
the relevant product and geographical markets).
117
Normally, monopoly power under section 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof
of a single-firm monopoly. Nonetheless, whether the conduct of duopolistic firms acting in tacit collusion creates a monopoly remains an open question. Compare Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a “split in authority” on the question of whether a monopolization claim may be proven by “combining
the market power of multiple defendants”), and Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v.
Gen. Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 490 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to decide “whether a
shared monopoly theory may be viable under some circumstances” because the instant
case provided no risk of a shared monopoly), and Santana Prod., Inc. v. Sylvester & Assoc., Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp’s suggestion that “Section 2 may be invoked against shared monopolies in
which ‘no single firm possesses sufficient power to be considered a ‘monopolist’ but
nevertheless a relatively few firms achieve monopoly-like’ results”), with Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1416 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the plaintiff’s theory “at best . . . poses the danger that [the defendant’s] . . . anticompetitive conduct could result in diminished price competition in an oligopolistic, or at
worst, duopolistic market. Section 2, however, does not govern single-firm anticom114
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in the applications market, the relevant product market would be the
provision of broadband services. The geographic market for monopoly power is the region where the broadband companies provide service to end users. For example, Cox Communications operates in lim118
ited areas within the United States, so its “geographic market,” for
the purpose of a monopoly analysis, would include only those regions
where it does offer broadband service.
Next, courts likely would look to the “cross-elasticity of demand”
to determine the market power of broadband providers in the rele119
vant geographic markets. Presently, the provision of broadband services is a duopoly; the only significant participants are DSL and cable
120
providers. As of the end of 2005, DSL and cable providers held over
121
90% of the broadband market.
In addition, many consumers have
little or no choice between broadband providers. To illustrate, 91%
of zip codes only have either one or zero cable providers to choose
122
from.
Thus, even those consumers who can choose between cable
and DSL lack meaningful choice, which suggests a low cross-elasticity
of demand.
Those who argue against NN regulations often claim that competition between broadband providers will protect consumer prefer-

petitive conduct aimed only at creating an oligopoly.”), and H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 724, 741 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[I]n order to
sustain a charge of monopolization or attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must allege the necessary domination of a particular defendant.”), and ID Sec. Sys. Canada,
Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 649 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[T]hose courts
that have squarely addressed the issue have determined that § 2 of the Sherman Act
applies to conduct of single firms only, rather than to the conduct of a small number
of firms engaged in tacit collusion, as in cases involving oligopoly, shared monopoly,
or . . . duopoly.”).
118
See Cox Communications, Customer Support, http://www.cox.com/support/
?gothere=/techsupport.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (providing a map of Cox Communications’ service areas).
119
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469
(1992) (“The extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in another, i.e., the ‘cross-elasticity of demand.’”
(quoting E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 400)).
120
Wireless broadband has grown as a competitor to DSL and cable in the last
year. However, the wireless technology cannot currently offer the same levels of speed
and service that its fixed-line rivals now provide. See supra note 106 and accompanying
text (discussing the future market possibilities for alternative broadband providers).
121
INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS:
STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2005, at 3 (2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-266596A1.pdf.
122
Id. at tbl.16.
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ences and maintain innovation. For example, they contend that if a
DSL provider institutes a pay-to-play system, consumers can switch
123
their Internet service to another broadband provider.
Although
this claim may prevail once the broadband services industry has
achieved the competitive ideal with a variety of providers—such as
DSL, cable, power line, satellite, WiFi, and 3G—offering broadband
services, the U.S. broadband market is still far from this competitive
ideal. Alternative broadband networks hold less than 2% of the cur124
rent residential market.
Thus, since about 58% of zip codes have
125
zero or one asymmetric DSL provider, in most areas of the country
the only other choice for a consumer may be a cable provider. Therefore, in today’s market, DSL and cable broadband service hold du126
opoly power.
In addition to maintaining duopoly power, both DSL and cable
providers have been signaling to one another their respective plans to
127
institute a pay-to-play system.
Due to the duopolistic nature of the
market—high concentration, barriers to entry, diffused buyers, transparent sales, largely homogeneous products, excess capacity, and contracts terminable at will—the likelihood of parallelism is extremely
128
high.
Thus, due to a captive consumer base and complete control
over fiberoptic networks, broadband providers have market power.
123

See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 95, at 1894 (“The presence of competition drastically
reduces the ability of network owners to use exclusivity arrangements to harm competition because disgruntled consumers can simply transfer their subscriptions to another
network.”).
124
INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., supra note 121, at chart 6. For the considerable
future, there likely will be only two dominant, partially competitive types of broadband
service. Id.
125
Id. at tbl.16.
126
On its face, the FCC data shows an increase in the number of competing
broadband providers and decreased market concentration. See, e.g., id. at tbls.8 & 16.
However, the FCC’s data and market analysis have been criticized for inaccurately overestimating consumer choice. See S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II:
THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S DIGITAL DECLINE 19 (2006) available at http://
www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf (generally criticizing the FCC’s broadband
data collection and analysis); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES,
BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS
(2006) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf (reassessing several of
the FCC’s broadband conclusions regarding consumer choices).
127
Broadband providers have been announcing their plans to institute a pay-toplay system through the media. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
128
See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 526-28
(5th ed. 2003) (stating the circumstances and factors surrounding a market with price
coordination among oligopolists).
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For the purposes of this Comment, I refer to cable and DSL providers in general terms. Although distinct broadband providers exist
for each type of technology, I believe there are reasons to safely make
129
generalized references here.
First, “the top two cable companies
and the top two DSL companies together controlled over half of the
130
U.S. broadband market.”
Thus, there remains significant concentration in the broadband market. Second, the “U.S. broadband mar131
ket is essentially a series of regional duopolies.”
According to a recent study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “the
132
median number of providers available to consumers [is] just two.”
Thus, the majority of broadband consumers have, at most, one choice:
the choice between cable and DSL.
2. Conduct Test: Refusal To Deal
Unfair competition can seriously harm consumers, particularly
133
when marked by “overly aggressive or predatory strategies.”
“Com134
petition on the merits” is to be protected, but in the time-sensitive
application market, a pay-to-play system would foreclose such competition. A price buffer would separate broadband providers from independent VoIP rivals, making it nearly impossible for these companies
to compete based on quality of service, design of application, and
other aspects.
Although section 2 of the Sherman Act provides multiple avenues
135
to pursue antitrust liability, a pay-to-play system would most signifi-

129

Of course, in order to make an actual determination of market power it is necessary to compile detailed market data.
130
Turner, supra note 126, at 19.
131
Id.
132
Id. (citing TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 126). The GAO criticized the
FCC’s most recent broadband data, in which the FCC concluded that “the median
number of providers” was eight. TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 126.
133
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 105.
134
Id.
135
For example, Internet application companies also may have a claim under the
“essential facilities doctrine.” Although several U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have
adopted this doctrine, the Supreme Court has neither rejected nor adopted it to date.
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004) (“We have never recognized [the essential facilities] doctrine, and we find no
need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.” (citation omitted)). In order
to establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities doctrine, a party
must prove four factors: “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential
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cantly violate the “conduct test” by breaching the limited duty of a
monopolist to continue to deal with competitors.
Generally, there is no absolute duty imposed upon a monopolist
136
to deal or cooperate with competitors.
However, a monopolist may
137
have a duty to deal with rivals in some circumstances. A monopolist
may violate its duty to deal, for instance, when it foregoes an established complementary relationship with a rival for an exclusionary
138
purpose.
Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., and their progeny support the general rule that “a firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if
it excludes rivals from the monopolized market by restricting a complementary or collaborative relationship without an adequate business
139
justification.”
Although courts and scholars have defined exclusion
in a variety of ways, one helpful definition describes it as “a practice
that ‘raises rival’s costs,’ either directly or indirectly through foreclos140
ing a rival from inexpensive access to customers.”

facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the
feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.”
Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 448 (2002) (quoting MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)). Although its elements of proof are slightly different,
the essential facilities doctrine is similar to the refusal-to-deal doctrine in a key way:
“The defendant’s duty to deal in the essential facility cases appears to have about the
same scope as the defendant’s duty to deal in the Aspen case, where the Court did not
rely on the essential facility doctrine.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 307 (2d ed. 1999).
136
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (discussing exceptions to the general “proposition that
there is no duty to aid competitors”).
137
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 114 (stating that “[a] monopolist’s
duty to deal is likely to be found when such dealings enhance consumer welfare and
when the refusal to deal raises rivals’ costs and has no efficiency or welfare-enhancing
justification”).
138
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486
(1992) (denying summary judgment to the defendant in an antitrust claim where the
defendant attempted to prohibit servicing of its equipment by independent companies); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985)
(holding that attempting to block a competing ski business from participating in a major-ticket program violated the duty to deal); see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11.
139
Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 496 (1999) (footnote omitted).
140
Id. at 496 n.9. In Aspen Skiing, “the Supreme Court defined exclusionary conduct as that which (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either
does not further meritorious competition or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive
way.” Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 529 (E.D.
Tex. 2004) (citing Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32); see also Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S.
at 482-83 (“The second element of a § 2 claim is the use of monopoly power ‘to fore-
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The Aspen Skiing litigation developed when Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.) refused to continue dealing with its smaller rival, As141
pen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Highlands).
For years prior to
the litigation, Ski Co. and Highlands worked jointly to provide the
“all-Aspen” ticket: a six-day ski ticket that allowed skiers to access the
four mountains in Aspen at a rate discounted from the individual
142
mountain rate. The two companies distributed revenues based on a
randomized survey that determined “how many skiers with the [four]143
area ticket used each mountain.”
Although Ski Co. attempted to
sell a competitive six-day ski ticket confined to its three mountains,
144
the collaborative four-area ticket outsold it “nearly two to one.”
Thus, as Jonathan Baker put it, even though the two mountains competed, “Highland’s product was a demand complement to Ski Co.’s
145
product in producing the all-Aspen ski ticket.”
In 1978, Ski Co. threatened to discontinue the all-Aspen ticket
unless Highlands accepted a percentage of revenues “considerably be146
low Highland’s historical average based on usage.”
When Highlands refused, Ski Co. offered a “three-area, six-day ticket featuring
147
only its mountains.”
Without participating in the all-Aspen ticket,
“Highlands basically bec[ame] a day ski area in a destination re148
sort.”
Thus, by being excluded from the all-Aspen ticket market,
close competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’” (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (citations omitted))); Thomas
G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J.
241, 249 (1987) (discussing how a monopoly can either restrain output below competitive levels, raise its price above competitive levels, or increase rivals’ costs).
141
Ski Co. owned and operated three of Aspen’s four mountains, while Highlands
owned and operated the fourth mountain. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589.
142
Id. at 589-91.
143
Id. at 590. “Highlands’ share of the revenues from the 4-area, 6-day ticket was
17.5% in 1973-1974, 18.5% in 1974-1975, 16.8% in 1975-1976, and 13.2% in 19761977.” Id.
144
Id. at 592.
145
Baker, supra note 139, at 498.
146
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 592. “[A] member of Ski Co.’s board of directors candidly informed a Highlands official that he had advocated making Highlands ‘an offer
that [it] could not accept.’” Id.
147
Id. at 593.
148
Id. at 594 (quotation marks omitted). Most of the skiers in Aspen traveled long
distances and stayed in the area for a week or more. Aspen patrons were largely uninterested in a day ski area and enjoyed the flexibility of being able to ski multiple mountains on one ticket. See Baker, supra note 139, at 498 (“Without participating in a convenient all-Aspen ticket, Highlands effectively became a day ski area in a destination
market, and was placed at a disadvantage in attracting the patronage of the many skiers
who came to Aspen from far away and stayed for a week.”).
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Highlands was placed at a significant competitive disadvantage and its
“share of the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen declined
149
steadily.”
The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in the record
was adequate to support a finding that Ski Co.’s behavior was unlaw150
fully exclusionary under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Court
focused on Ski Co.’s abandonment of the profitable course of dealing,
stressing that “the monopolist elected to make an important change
in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive mar151
ket and had persisted for several years.”
Important in the Court’s
determination was the fact that Ski Co. “fail[ed] to offer any efficiency
152
The Court concluded
justification . . . for its pattern of conduct.”
that “the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its cus153
tomers from doing business with its smaller rival.”
Although Aspen Skiing has been the subject of scholarly criticism
154
over the years, and was deemed by Justice Scalia to be “at or near
155
the outer boundary of § 2 liability,” the Supreme Court nevertheless
unanimously reaffirmed that its Aspen Skiing holding regarding refusals to deal remains good law in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of156
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.
149

Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 594. After the four-day ticket was abolished in 1977,
Highlands revenues went “from 20.5% in 1976-1977, to 15.7% in 1977-1978, to 13.1%
in 1978-1979, to 12.5% in 1979-1980, to 11% in 1980-1981.” Id.
150
Id. at 610-11.
151
Id. at 603.
152
Id. at 608.
153
Id. at 610. The Court also noted “that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.” Id. at 610-11.
154
For example, Professor Hovenkamp states that “[t]he difficult question for
those supporting Aspen is finding a way of applying its principle, without losing control
of it.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 135, at 295.
155
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
156
Id.; see also Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513,
536 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (“The bottom line is that criticism notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that Aspen Skiing’s holding about unilateral refusals to deal is good
law.”). In Trinko, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s refusal-to-deal
claims did “not fit within the limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing.” Trinko,
540 U.S. at 409. The Court distinguished the Trinko defendant’s actions as statutorily
compelled. Id. Thus, without a voluntary course of conduct to use as a baseline
against which to compare the defendant’s present actions, “anticompetitive malice”
could not be distinguished from “competitive zeal.” Id.; see also Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply the
Aspen Skiing framework because the court was “unable to view [the defendant’s] mar-
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In Trinko, the Supreme Court re-emphasized two of the three distinctive features of Aspen Skiing that made the imposition of liability
appropriate. First, Ski Co.’s “unilateral termination of a voluntary
(and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive
157
end.”
In addition, Ski Co.’s “unwillingness to renew the ticket even
if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive
158
bent.”
Similar to Aspen Skiing, “the Kodak case emerged out of a change
in a firm’s business policies that harmed rivals by exploiting a rela159
tionship involving product complements.”
Kodak manufactured
160
and sold “high-volume photocopiers and micrographic equipment.”
In addition, it also separately sold repair services and replacement
161
parts for its machines directly to its customers.
For half a decade,
Kodak also sold replacement parts to independent service organizations (ISOs), which would independently provide repair services to
162
customers, often at a discounted rate.
Thus, ISOs were Kodak’s rivals when servicing Kodak’s equipment, but they were also Kodak’s
163
parts distributors.
The litigation began after Kodak began selling
replacement parts only to customers who either used Kodak’s repair
164
services or repaired their own machines, rather than hiring ISOs.
Through this policy, Kodak aimed to “make it more difficult for ISOs

ket practices in both competitive and noncompetitive conditions”); Levine v. BellSouth
Corp., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (distinguishing Levine from Aspen
Skiing because the court could find “no prior conduct that sheds light upon Defendant’s motivation in not providing . . . service”). Additionally, the Trinko Court found
“the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive
harm” to be of “particular importance” in its decision not to apply the Aspen Skiing
doctrine. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
157
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (emphasis omitted).
158
Id. (emphasis omitted).
159
Baker, supra note 139, at 499.
160
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456-57 (1992).
161
Id. at 457. “Kodak [did] not sell a complete system of original equipment, lifetime service, and lifetime parts for a single price.” Id.
162
Id. In addition, “[s]ome ISO customers purchase[d] their own parts and
hire[d] ISO’s only for service.” Id. at 458. Thus, customers either repaired the machines themselves, hired Kodak to perform service on their machine, or hired an ISO
to do so. Id. at 457-58.
163
Baker, supra note 139, at 499.
164
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458 (detailing Kodak’s policy of limiting ISOs’ access to Kodak-produced parts).
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165

to sell service for Kodak machines.”
Most of the ISOs “lost substan166
tial revenue” or were driven out of business.
Although the Supreme Court largely focused on Kodak’s tying
sales of service to sales of parts, the Court also determined that the
ISOs had presented evidence from which a court could find “that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used
its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak
167
service market.”
Thus, liability turned on “whether ‘valid business
168
reasons’ [could] explain Kodak’s actions.”
The Court concluded
that “[n]one of Kodak’s asserted business justifications” were suffi169
cient to grant Kodak summary judgment.
As Professor Baker explains, the legal analyses of the conduct requirement in the Aspen Skiing and Kodak refusal-to-deal decisions have
three key features in common. First, in both cases, “the Court found
that a rival (or rivals) was substantially excluded from that market by
defendant’s conduct, in the sense that the rival was weakened significantly (by a reduction in demand or increase in costs) or forced to
170
exit.”
Second, the Court in both cases “found that the monopolist
excluded its rival or rivals from the market where the two competed
by exploiting another relationship between the two, either a collabo171
rative or complementary one.”
In both Aspen Skiing and Kodak, the
collaborative vertical relationship between the firms created an opportunity for the monopolist to exclude the plaintiff from the com172
petitive horizontal market.
Third, instead of directly considering
the effect on competition, the Court inferred harm to competition
173
“from the absence of a valid and sufficient business justification.”

165

Id. at 458. Kodak achieved its goal by limiting ISO access to all sources of Kodak parts. Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 483.
168
Id. Kodak contended that it had three valid business justifications: “(1) to
promote interbrand equipment competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of
its service; (2) to improve asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and
(3) to prevent ISOs from free riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts
and service.” Id.
169
Id. at 485-86.
170
Baker, supra note 139, at 501.
171
Id. “[A] change in prior conduct was a feature of both cases.” Id. at 502.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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A pay-to-play system shares these three features and would have
exclusionary effects on Internet application companies, like Vonage,
that directly compete with broadband providers’ applications.
First, once a pay-to-play system is implemented, Internet application companies that rely on time-sensitive delivery will be effectively
excluded from the market. Using the VoIP example, if the application company does not pay the required fee for priority delivery, there
is a strong likelihood that its VoIP service will not work properly during periods of high congestion. The broadband provider, however,
will always provide priority status to its own revenue-generating VoIP
174
product, ensuring proper delivery of voice packets.
On the other
hand, if a VoIP application company did agree to pay a priority delivery fee to help guarantee the proper functioning of its service, broadband providers would have successfully put that company at an eco175
nomic disadvantage by artificially raising its costs of doing business.
Under either scenario, VoIP application companies like Vonage
176
would be “excluded” from the VoIP market.
Second, this exclusion from the market will become possible only
because, with a pay-to-play system, broadband providers will be exploiting a vertical relationship that was previously complementary.
Prior to the implementation of the pay-to-play system, broadband providers and Internet application companies shared a mutually beneficial relationship. The value of a broadband provider’s service ulti177
mately depends on which applications and content it supports.
Simply put, the more applications and content that are made accessi-

174

This conduct is analogous to the harm created in Kodak. Because Kodak prevented access to its repair parts, the ISOs were unable to effectively perform their service. Assured a supply of parts, Kodak was the only one able to continue to provide
repair services. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458.
175
This scenario is similar to Aspen Skiing, in which Ski Co. threatened to cut off
the all-Aspen pass unless Highlands accepted reduced compensation. Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 592 (1985). Ski Co.’s action was
essentially a pay-to-play policy. After Highlands refused and Ski Co. terminated its participation in the all-Aspen pass, Highlands attempted to create a multiple-mountain
pass by purchasing lift tickets to Ski Co.’s mountains at retail. Id. at 593-94. Thus, as a
result of the exclusionary tactics, Highlands was forced to sell its multiple-mountain
pass at a much higher price than the Ski Co. multiple-mountain pass, or else risk more
significant losses. Id.
176
See Baker, supra note 139, at 496 n.9 (defining exclusion as forcing a rival to
exit the market or weakening the rival “significantly” by increasing its costs or reducing
demand for its services).
177
See Wu, supra note 4, at 85 (describing the appeal of broadband as linked to its
ability to accept a variety of content).

2007]

VOIP AND PAY-TO-PLAY

1335

ble, the more a consumer is willing to pay for her broadband connection. As a result, broadband providers owe most of their financial suc178
cess to the development of applications and content. Thus, to date,
most broadband providers have maintained large “downstream” ac179
cess in order to attract customers to their services.
Many commentators argue that, despite the current pay-to-play
musings, broadband providers have an incentive to maintain open
platforms in order to bring the highest value to the end user. As evidence, they point to the failure of Internet providers that did not preserve application open access (specifically, Prodigy and Compu180
Serv).
These commentators believe that vertical integration often
181
leads to important efficiencies and is not dangerous to competition.
Their argument suggests that, to a “platform monopolist” like a broadband provider,
the applications are its inputs, and the monopolist has the same interest
as any other party in minimizing its input costs. Hence, if allowing open
application development saves the monopolist money, then it will do
so. . . . This analysis leads to a presumption that, in the telecommunications market, vertically integrated companies, even with monopoly
power, should generally be left unregulated, absent special conditions,
or exceptions. 182

The pay-to-play situation, though, embodies one of these exceptions: a company may take anticompetitive actions against applications that ride on its networks when that company’s “revenue stream

178
It is also important to note that the development of applications and the success of businesses such as Vonage or Napster would not have been possible without
high speed fiberoptic networks.
179
See Wu, supra note 16, at 162-63 (describing broadband providers’ present restrictions on network use). For a comprehensive discussion of network restrictions see
id. at 156-65.
180
See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1888 (“The failure of early proprietary services provided by America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy attests to the market’s ability to
discipline network owners who attempt to impose closed architectures on consumers
who prefer open ones.”). CompuServ and Prodigy maintained “self-contained ‘walled
garden’ networks,” in which subscribers’ connections were limited to other members
and centralized content. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1974, 1991 (2006). Their networks were “slow to evolve because potential audiences of
developers were slowed or shut out by centralized control over the network’s services.”
Id.
181
See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-105 (2003) (describing the concept of “internalizing complementary efficiencies”).
182
Wu, supra note 4, at 86.
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[may] be endangered by allowing unmitigated competition among
183
unaffiliated applications.”
For example, Madison River Communi184
cations blocked Vonage’s VoIP service on its broadband network.
In balancing the value of its traditional public switched telephone service against the value of its broadband service, Madison River chose to
degrade its broadband network in order to protect its “voice-based
185
revenues.”
Similarly, as Internet-based video services grow in popularity and availability, “it is quite possible that cable providers . . . may
face similar incentives” to block or degrade rival applications offering
186
video over the Internet.
Thus, although there is economic theory
suggesting that broadband providers will not exploit their complementary relationships with Internet application companies, actual experience demonstrates that broadband providers have incentives to
protect their core businesses at the expense of the Internet application companies.
Internet application companies, relying upon the mutually beneficial relationship with broadband providers, have spent capital developing innovative applications, many of which require time-sensitive
187
delivery.
Broadband providers have recognized the cost advantages
of a VoIP telephony system and have entered the market as horizontal
competitors. However, instead of competing on the merits, they seek
to monopolize the VoIP market by exploiting their position of controlling the last mile to the end user. By raising the cost of competing
for rival VoIP providers, broadband providers are exploiting access to
consumers that they never would have had were it not for open-access
networks and innovations created by Internet application companies.
Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications,
Inc. provides a similar factual situation, in which the owner of a radio
station exploited a complementary relationship with local concert promoters in order to gain a monopoly in the concert promotion mar188
ket.
The plaintiff, Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. (NIPP), pro-

183

ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 46, at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
185
See id. (“[Madison River’s] interest in protecting its voice-based revenues overrode its interest in providing a more valuable broadband service.”).
186
Id.
187
Similarly, in Kodak, the ISOs invested in training for their employees and in the
development of the copier-service market based upon their reliance on the availability
of parts from Kodak. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
485 (1992).
188
311 F. Supp. 2d. 1048, 1061 (D. Colo. 2004).
184
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moted concerts in the Denver, Colorado, area.
The defendant,
Clear Channel Communications, was “one of the largest radio and en190
tertainment conglomerates in the world.”
Clear Channel owned
191
and operated eight radio stations in Denver.
It also owned
SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment (SFX), a national concert promotions division, and Clear Channel Radio Festivals (Festivals), a radio
192
concert promotions division.
Both nationally and in the Denver market, radio stations and con193
cert promoters share a complementary relationship.
As the NIPP
Court explained, “[b]y advertising [a] concert, the radio generates
more interest in the artist, which encourages listeners to listen to the
radio to hear about the artist’s concert and to hear the artist’s
194
songs.” It is customary, therefore, for radio stations to
“promote” concerts for free, above and beyond the advertising time purchased by the concert promoter, by mentioning the concert on-air, holding ticket giveaways, and conducting interviews with artists. Such free
promotion greatly benefits the concert promoter as well as the station by
195
generating publicity and demand for the concert.

However, when Clear Channel entered the concert promotion
business, its radio stations immediately stopped providing free promo196
tional support and advertising to any rival concert promoters. NIPP
alleged that, as soon as Clear Channel became a horizontal competitor, Clear Channel gave “preferential treatment to its [own] concert
197
promotion business.”
Although no rival promoters were allowed to
have contact with Clear Channel’s radio program, music, or promotions directors, SFX was “free to continue to have direct conversations
with [Clear Channel radio stations] concerning concert promotion in
198
the Denver market.”
189

Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1056.
191
Id. Eight was the maximum number of radio stations that one media company
was allowed to own in the Denver area under the FCC rules. Id.
192
SFX was the “largest concert producer and entertainment promoter in the nation.” Id.
193
Although “radio stations derive most of their income from advertisers who pay
for advertising spots,” they also receive significant benefits from assisting concert promoters on air. Id. at 1060.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1060-61 (citation omitted).
196
Id. at 1063-64.
197
Id. at 1064.
198
Id.
190
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Citing Aspen Skiing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado concluded that Clear Channel’s refusal to provide free promotional support “is . . . in the worst interest of Clear Channel radio sta199
tions, which demonstrates an intent to monopolize.”
Thus, the
court held that Clear Channel’s refusal to deal “compels a trial on the
200
issue of anticompetitive conduct in this case.”
Similar to broadband providers’ artificial increase of competing
Internet application companies’ costs through the pay-to-play system,
the Clear Channel radio stations increased the costs of all other rival
concert promoters by withholding previously complimentary on-air
concert promotion. In addition, just as applications help to drive the
value of broadband service, a portion of the financial success of the
Clear Channel radio stations could be attributed to the complementary relationship with the independent concert promoters. Thus,
Clear Channel exploited the previously complementary relationship
with concert promoters in order to monopolize the concert promotions market.
Third, and finally, in both Aspen Skiing and Kodak, the Court inferred harm to competition from the lack of business justification for
201
the conduct.
In analyzing conduct under a rule-of-reason standard,
violative “exclusionary strategies . . . must be distinguished from beneficial or benign competitive methods that will be tolerated even from
202
a monopolist.”
Thus, a broadband provider must offer a “procom203
petitive justification” for its conduct.
The plaintiff may establish liability if it can rebut the justification or “demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive
204
benefit.”
This is where the ultimate battleground lies for determining liability.
199

Id. at 1106-07. Important to the district court’s conclusion was that Clear
Channel seemed to act against its own “commercial best interest” by refusing to provide advertising and promotional support to promoters. Id. at 1107 (“Assuming that
the refusal to deal is not in the best commercial interests of the radio stations, an inference could be made that the refusal supports other, more sinister motives, such as
the creation of a monopoly.”). NIPP was also able to demonstrate “an increase in concert ticket prices and a decreasing market share for all of Clear Channel’s competitors
in the rock concert market” following Clear Channel’s refusal to deal. Id.
200
Id. at 1108.
201
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
202
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 102, at 105.
203
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (defining
a “procompetitive justification” as “a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a
form of competition on the merits”).
204
Id.
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The procompetitive justifications that broadband providers are
likely to offer in defense of an antritrust claim are (1) the prevention
205
of free riding upon their capital investments, (2) the need to ensure
206
quality service, and (3) a lack of economic incentive to engage in
such exclusionary activities.
First and foremost, broadband providers assert that Internet ap207
plication companies are free riding on their “pipes.”
This contention is similar to an argument presented in Kodak. Kodak attempted
to justify its exclusionary conduct as “prevent[ing] ISOs from freeriding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts and ser208
vice.”
Both sides admitted that the ISOs “invest[ed] substantially in
the service market, with training of repair workers and investment in
209
parts inventory.”
Kodak asserted that “the ISO’s [were] free-riding
210
because they . . . failed to enter the equipment and parts markets.”
The Court rejected this justification outright, explaining that “[t]his
211
understanding of free-riding has no support in our case law.”
The
Court noted that it would be unreasonable and contrary to the antitrust laws to require a competitor “to enter two markets simultane212
ously” in order to compete.
Similar to the ISOs in Kodak, Internet application companies have
made considerable investments in developing their applications.
Broadband providers cannot claim, as required under Kodak, that the
application companies are free riding on their investments in compet205

See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing broadband providers’
promotion of the free rider argument).
206
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (specifying quality service and efficiency as benefits of smart pipes).
207
AT&T Chairman Edward E. Whitacre Jr. recently argued: “‘They don’t have
any fiber out there. They don’t have any wires. . . . They use my lines for free—and
that’s bull. For a Google or a Yahoo or a Vonage or anybody to expect to use these
pipes for free is nuts!’” Christopher Stern, The Coming Tug of War over the Internet,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2006, at B1.
208
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
209
Id. at 485.
210
Id.
211
Id. The Supreme Court distinguished Kodak’s asserted free-rider justification
from both Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), where “the Court accepted freeriding as a justification because without restrictions a manufacturer would not be able
to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital
and labor necessary to distribute the product.” Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 485 n.33.
212
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 485 (“[O]ne of the evils proscribed by the antitrust
laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.”).
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ing applications. Instead, they implicitly resort to the argument rejected by the Kodak Court: that in order to avoid free riding, the application companies must enter both the application and broadband
213
markets.
Thus, using the pay-to-play system to prevent free riding is
not a legitimate business justification under antitrust law.
As an alternative justification, the broadband providers assert that
a pay-to-play system is a fair and reasonable method of ensuring quality service to the end user. They argue that, due to increased congestion of the networks, it is necessary to build high bandwidth fiberoptic
networks optimized for time-sensitive applications, such as voice, mu214
sic, or video delivery.
In order to maintain the high quality of service to end users on the optimized lines, they claim that they must use
“smart pipe” technology to assign different levels of priority to differ215
ent applications.
Thus, the argument goes, the pay-to-play system
takes advantage of this new market created for priority delivery and is
in no way meant to affect the applications that compete with broadband providers’ core revenue-generating services (generally, phone or
video services).
However, similar to the situation in Aspen Skiing, the broadband
providers are foregoing short-term gains for long-term monopoly
power. In Aspen Skiing, the Court pointed out that Ski Co. placed its
sunk investment at risk by refusing to continue past welfare-enhancing
216
cooperation. Similarly, in the context of VoIP, broadband providers
that are implementing a pay-to-play system are degrading the value of
their networks by reducing the number of applications effectively
reaching the end consumer and by significantly increasing their trans-

213

See Stern, supra note 207, at B1. AT&T Chairman Whitacre emphasizes the fact
that Internet application companies “don’t have any wires.” Id. Thus, he suggests that
such companies must build their own networks in order to avoid free riding upon his
company’s pipes.
214
See Yoo, supra note 17, at 35-36 (explaining that increased consumer demand
causes the need the upgrade the networks).
215
See id. at 36 (discussing broadband providers’ consideration of “policy-based
routers” to prioritize applications).
216
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985)
(“[T]he evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”); see also Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004)
(“The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of
dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.” (emphasis omitted)).
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217

action costs of monitoring their networks.
Even if broadband pro218
viders recoup some of these losses through the pay-to-play system,
the extremely high cost of implementing such a system implicates an219
other incentive for doing so—long-term monopoly power.
This is
strong evidence that the broadband providers’ quality service justifications are pretextual.
Even if a court concludes that the quality-service argument is
strong and creates a legitimate business justification, a plaintiff still
may establish liability by showing that the anticompetitive harm out220
weighs the procompetitive benefit.
In the VoIP context, the potential for anticompetitive harm is significant. The pay-to-play system increases rival costs considerably, thus effectively excluding them from
the market.
Finally, commentators like Christopher Yoo, who support the
freedom for broadband companies to experiment with different pric-

217

See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1875 (describing the significant transaction costs associated with metering Internet usage). Yoo suggests that usage-sensitive pricing
would be uneconomical and possibly more substantial than metering costs for the
telephone industry, in which “the costs of metering and billing represent more than
50% of the costs associated with an incremental call.” Id. at 1868, 1875. Internet protocols break “every piece of communication into smaller packets that are transmitted
individually and reassembled at their destination.” Id. at 1875. Since “each packet is
allowed to move independently . . . it is possible that different packets from the same
communications to pass through different routes on their way to their destination.” Id.
Thus, “the number of records needed to account for the packets associated with a tenminute telephone call over the Internet could number in the tens of thousands.” Id.
As a result, “the industry has struggled to develop workable methods for metering
Internet usage.” Id.
218
Broadband providers may also argue that the pay-to-play system, unlike Ski
Co.’s three-mountain pass, was designed to increase both short-term and long-term
profits. However, in Delaware & Hudson Railway Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d
174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit rejected the alleged monopolist’s claim
that the maximization of profits provided a sufficient legitimate business justification
for its refusal to deal with a competitor. The court held that “[a] monopolist cannot
escape liability for conduct that is otherwise actionable simply because that conduct
also provides short-term profits.” Id.
219
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (emphasizing the significance of Ski Co.’s willingness
in Aspen Skiing “to forsake short-term profits to achieve a long-run anticompetitive
end”).
220
Since the broadband providers may be able to present a legitimate business justification, a court likely would engage in a rule-of-reason balancing of procompetitive
benefits versus anticompetitive effects of such conduct. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining the rule-of-reason analysis).
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221

ing strategies, often cite the Chicago School of Economics’ “one
monopoly rent” theory (also referred to as the “one monopoly profit”
theory) in justifying the broadband companies’ vertical integration
222
into the application market for VoIP. They argue that, under either
the one monopoly rent theory or its broader version, called “ICE,” the
companies will “internalize complementary efficiencies arising from
223
[Internet] applications created by others.”
As a result, the argument goes, the broadband companies have no economic incentive to
exclude their competitors from the market.
Although this theory is largely accepted by academics, there are
two major exceptions to the general rule. First, efficient competition
in the applications market can be problematic to achieve if one of the
competitors controls the platform. During the early stages of deployment, a platform provider, such as a broadband company, has “incen224
tives to organize service innovation efficiently.”
But, Jospeh Farrell
explains, this incentive loses its force as the platform provider becomes able to collect “quasi-rents,” thereby gaining the incentive to
225
“sabotage” innovations.
The pay-to-play system that broadband providers plan to institute signals exactly this type of sabotage to independent VoIP companies.
Second, if the one monopoly rent theory were controlling, a DSL
provider would be pleased to grant VoIP applications free access to its
network because the applications would make the network more valu226
able to users and, therefore, more profitable for the DSL provider.
221

See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005)
(advocating a market-based solution that would encourage “network diversity” in the
provision of broadband).
222
See Yoo, supra note 95, at 1888 (arguing that the “one monopoly rent theorem”
holds in the context of broadband).
223
Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 97-105. Farrell and Weiser have reformulated the theory—under the name “one monopoly profit” theory—into a broader
claim that they call “internalizing complementary efficiencies” or “ICE.” Id. They explain that the “‘one monopoly profit’ label captures only part of ICE.” Id. at 104. Both
ICE and the “one monopoly profit” theory “claim[] that a platform monopolist cannot
gain by inefficiently leveraging its market power into applications.” Id. “But ICE goes
further, stressing the broader principle that the platform monopolist gains from an
efficient applications market . . . .” Id. For the purposes of this discussion, the theories
are coterminous.
224
Joseph Farrell, Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network (Competition
Policy Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper No. CPC03-037, 2003), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC03-037.
225
Id.
226
See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 109 (“[C]onsider the attitude of cable
providers toward streaming video applications over their cable modems. ICE would
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However, as Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser explain, “a cable provider who allows video streaming will find it harder to engage in the
profitable and customary price discrimination that sets high markups
for premium cable programming,” and thus, “might rationally, but in227
efficiently, try to stop this innovative method of distribution.”
Similarly, a DSL provider that allows VoIP calls on its network will find it
much more difficult to price discriminate and profit from its traditional public switched telephone services. Thus, rather than allowing
Internet application companies to offer VoIP to its customers, a DSL
provider might instead focus on stifling VoIP’s development and proliferation.
B. Effect on the Market: What if Application Companies Win?
Under the Aspen and Kodak frameworks, broadband providers may
be held accountable for establishing a pay-to-play system for companies with which they directly compete in the application market. In
the case of VoIP, even if application companies greatly increase their
subscriber numbers, the applications will not have an appreciable effect on broadband traffic. Just over the horizon, however, looms the
potential for HD-quality video. What will happen if application companies, shielded by this precedent, begin to use larger and larger
amounts of bandwidth?
According to Gary R. Bachula, Vice President of Internet2, this
question has already been answered in practice in the form of Internet2. Internet2 is a not-for-profit partnership whose “mission is to advance the state of the Internet . . . by operating for [its] members a
very advanced, private, ultra-high-speed research and education net228
work called Abilene.”
Abilene allows users to “‘live in the future’ of
229
advanced broadband.”

suggest that cable providers should happily endorse this use of their platform, as it
would make the platform more valuable to users and therefore more profitable.”).
227
Id.
228
Hearing, supra note 90, at 65 (testimony of Gary R. Bachula). Abilene provides
“very high speed pipes [that are] 10,000 times faster than home broadband,” in order
to enable its members to innovate by “try[ing] new uses of the network, develop[ing]
new applications, [and] experiment[ing] with new forms of communications.” Id.
229
Id. Users are able to take classes with teachers across the globe via “DVDquality video conferencing technology,” and “[r]ecently, students at Wichita State were
able to play and take lessons from the New World Symphony in Miami using Internet2’s network.” Id.
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While designing this network, Internet2 engineers assumed that a
“smart pipe” that prioritized certain “bits” over others would be neces230
sary to assure prompt delivery of time-sensitive packets.
For years,
engineers thus attempted to ensure quality of service by inserting intelligence into the network; however, as the network developed, “research and practical experience supported the conclusion that it was
231
far more cost effective to simply provide more bandwidth.”
The researchers found that a sufficient increase in bandwidth alleviated congestion and removed the need to provide “preferential treatment” for
232
time-sensitive packets.
Experience has shown that the costs of improving the bandwidth
of a network are not too steep:
For example, a university campus in the Midwest that serves 14,000 students and faculty recently estimated it would cost about [$50 a year per
user] . . . [t]o upgrade to 1000 Mbps . . . . University campuses are like
small towns or suburban neighborhoods. Once [broadband providers]
make their initial fiber investment, the relative cost of upgrading band233
width to customers is small.

The antitrust framework outlined in this Comment would not
prevent broadband providers from charging consumers for different
levels of access to bandwidth. Thus, broadband providers would have
ample incentives to upgrade their networks’ bandwidth capacities.
C. Use of “Judicial” Antitrust
The use of antitrust principles to remedy anticompetitive harms in
the broadband and Internet application markets is a pragmatic approach that avoids the necessity of overly broad government legislation, while preserving innovation and competition on the merits.
1. Antitrust in the New Economy
Although “[a]ntitrust law is often characterized as an alternative
to regulation,” some argue that antitrust courts should generally re234
frain from intervening in “new economy” monopolization cases.
In

230

Id. at 2.
Id.
232
Id. (“All of the bits arrive fast enough, even if intermingled.”).
233
Id. at 4.
234
Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era,
50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 550 (2005) (providing now-Justice Breyer’s description that
231
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support of this position, commentators often point to the Schumpete235
rian critique and the risk of false positives.
First, under the Schumpeterian view, market success entices rival
companies to enter the market and develop “new technologies that
236
will ultimately unseat the incumbent.”
As a result, “any market
237
power enjoyed by a dominant firm will be temporary.”
Thus, antitrust enforcement is “at best unnecessary and at wors[t] counterpro238
ductive.”
In Trinko, Justice Scalia acknowledged the Schumpeterian
viewpoint, noting that “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly
prices . . . induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
239
growth.”
However, courts have largely been unwilling to “accept a reduced
240
role for antitrust.”
Philip Weiser suggests that this reluctance “rests
241
on a sound theoretical and empirical basis.”
For example, he recognizes that “entrenched firms with monopoly power . . . will often
decline to deploy new technologies and will seek to undermine the
242
success of those that do.”
Thus, antitrust plays “an important role”
in protecting the entry of innovative companies, like Vonage, who “deploy new technologies that will challenge the position of incumbent
243
firms.”
Second, the concern about false positives highlights the awareness
that overzealous antitrust courts can ultimately suppress efficient prac244
tices and harm consumer welfare.
In Trinko, as Weiser points out,
“the Court echoed this concern by noting that ‘[t]he cost of false posi245
tives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.’”
“regulation and antitrust aim at ‘similar goals’” (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.))).
235
Id. at 551.
236
Id. at 552.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
240
Weiser, supra note 234, at 552.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 553; see also notes 180-186 and accompanying text (describing the risk
that broadband providers will harm Internet application companies that threaten their
core businesses).
243
Weiser, supra note 234, at 553.
244
Id. at 554. This concern is heightened when, in the “new economy,” the potential effects of intrusion on the market “are less than clear.” Id.
245
Id. at 555 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)).
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On the other hand, the risk of false negatives also presents challenges. If unchecked by antitrust principles, “monopoly firms”—such
as broadband providers protecting their core voice or video businesses—“may well seek to slow the pace of innovation thereby ‘denying consumers the full benefits of technological progress that a dy246
namically competitive market would offer.’”
The new economy—which includes the provision of broadband
services and the development of Internet applications—presents both
economic and legal challenges to regulators and courts alike. The arguments for antitrust forbearance in the new economy accurately illuminate the risks that an overzealous court may have on the market.
But the risks created by not enforcing antitrust through the courts
loom just as large. The focus should not be on whether courts should
apply antitrust in the new economy; rather, the focus should be on
when and how to apply the antitrust principles. Thus, even if antitrust
courts should be cautious about engaging in the appropriate scrutiny,
they continue to provide an important checking function against
predatory conduct.
2. Town of Concord Principle
When examining the role of antitrust for regulated industries,
such as the provision of broadband, “courts and commentators have
struggled with the challenge of ensuring that regulation and antitrust
247
coexist in a harmonious” manner.
The “Town of Concord principle”
has emerged to define the bounds of antitrust liability when regula248
tion exists.
According to the “discretionary version” of the princi249
250
ple, which the Trinko Court seemed to endorse, “the extent of an-

246

Id. at 557-58 (citing Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 673, 674 (1999)).
247
Weiser, supra note 234, at 561.
248
Id.; see also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
249
Weiser also recognizes a “categorical version” of the Town of Concord principle,
under which “the presence of an expert agency on the scene should restrain antitrust
courts from evaluating whether section 2 liability should attach.” Weiser, supra note
234, at 562.
250
See id. (“Trinko can best be interpreted as embracing only the discretionary version of the Town of Concord principle.”). In Trinko, the Supreme Court quoted Town of
Concord for the proposition that “‘antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it
applies.’” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411-12 (2004) (quoting Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 22).
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titrust restraint should vary depending on whether the regulatory regime is reasonably effective at addressing the relevant anticompetitive
251
conduct.”
Thus, the Town of Concord principle “should and will be
applied on a case by case basis” requiring “antitrust courts to make
two preliminary judgments: (1) ‘how well is the regulatory enterprise
doing its job’; and (2) ‘how much confidence’ should we have that antitrust oversight will ‘improve competition in the situation at
252
hand’?”
In applying the Town of Concord principle in Trinko, the Supreme
253
Court determined that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 pro254
vided an “effective” level of “regulatory oversight.”
Specifically, the
Court stressed that where “a regulatory structure designed to deter
and remedy anticompetitive harm . . . exists, the additional benefit to
competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small,
and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such
255
additional scrutiny.”
In assessing the Act, the Court highlighted a
section granting the FCC authority for the “imposition of penalties” in
256
the event of anticompetitive conduct.
Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that, in this case, the “benefits of antitrust intervention”
were “slight” and ultimately held that the respondent failed to state a
257
claim under the Sherman Act.
In contrast to the Telecommunications Act’s regulation of traditional phone service that was at issue in Trinko, the regulation of
broadband services and Internet applications has been significantly
258
reduced.
Although the FCC has taken action when an Internet ap259
plication was blocked, it remains noncommittal toward an official
260
policy regarding pay-to-play.
In addition, the present form of the
251

Weiser, supra note 234, at 562.
Id. at 568 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 353-54).
253
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
254
Id. at 564.
255
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
256
Id. at 413; Weiser, supra note 234, at 565.
257
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414-16; Weiser, supra note 234, at 565.
258
See supra Part III.A (discussing the “lighter regulatory touch” by the FCC in the
market for broadband Internet access).
259
See ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 46, at 3 (noting that the FCC “act[ed] to
ban the blocking of Vonage’s [VoIP] service by Madison River Communications”); see
also supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text (describing Madison River Communications’s attempt to block Vonage’s VoIP service).
260
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing FCC Chairman Martin’s
statements regarding pay-to-play).
252
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COPE Act would provide a toothless antitrust enforcement mecha261
nism.
Thus, the FCC is unlikely to effectively address anticompetitive conduct by broadband providers.
The next step under a Town of Concord analysis entails evaluating
whether antitrust enforcement would “improve the competition in the
262
situation at hand.”
Thus, the focus should turn to available remedies. This Comment next discusses the remedies that antitrust courts
have at their disposal.
3. Remedies
Antitrust remedies play an important role in both regulated and
unregulated industries. 263 However, in some situations, “antitrust law
264
should refrain from providing relief.” For example, some cases may
be identified as “irremedial because they would require certain judg265
ments . . . that are outside the competence of antitrust courts.”
In
Trinko, the Court enthusiastically quoted Phillip Areeda’s analysis that
“‘[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or
adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed
irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the
court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
266
agency.’”
Thus, in the duty-to-deal context, a court must be able to
“provide meaningful relief without undertaking the role of a regula267
tory agency.”

261

See discussion supra note 71. The maximum penalty for a violation of the FCC’s
broadband policy statement would be a mere $500,000, and the FCC would be without
authority to “adopt or implement rules or regulations regarding enforcement of the
broadband policy statement.” H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006).
262
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
263
See Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“[T]he availability of an antitrust remedy provides
an important safety valve for and a backstop to the regulatory regime.”).
264
Id. at 9-10 (describing, under the Town of Concord principle, “three types of
cases involving regulated entities where antitrust law should refrain from providing
relief”).
265
Id. at 10. Instead, such judgments are often “within the core province of regulatory agencies.” Id.
266
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
415 (2004) (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989) (alteration in original)).
267
Weiser, supra note 263, at 15.
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According to Philip Weiser, there are several alternate approaches
that would enable an antitrust court to provide such “meaningful relief.”
First, courts can rely on a prior course of dealing to provide re268
lief.
As discussed above, in Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court relied
in part upon the prior course of dealing in affirming a treble damages
269
verdict.
Weiser cautions, though, that such a remedy may be inade270
quate in fast-moving technology markets.
As a result, when relying
upon a prior course of conduct in the provision of broadband services, courts should be aware of market changes before determining
the baseline for relief.
Second, Weiser explains, courts can rely on “an arrangement or
industry custom regulated by a regulatory agency” in crafting a rem271
edy.
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court provided relief that was to be enforced by a regulatory agency instead of
272
by the court. Thus, the Otter Tail approach allowed the Court to adjudicate an important antitrust case and “award relief without becoming mired in the day-to-day administration of a conduct remedy that a
273
regulatory agency can better monitor.”
Third, courts can rely on a “non-discrimination standard whereby
a company gives its competitor access to a facility on the same terms
274
and conditions as it gives itself or a preferred customer.”
This standard accounts for dynamic pricing schedules in an industry by setting
275
a “moving benchmark for an access right.”
In the broadband provider context, a court would have to compartmentalize a provider’s
broadband service division and VoIP division and identify the transfer
268

Id. at 18-20.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the prior course of dealing in Aspen Skiing).
270
Weiser, supra note 263, at 18-19. Weiser also cautions courts to consider that a
remedy based on a prior course of dealing “levies a tax on a firm’s prior willingness to
deal (by punishing its subsequent change) and thus may deter valuable experimentation in future business strategies.” Id. at 19.
271
Id. at 15.
272
410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973) (affirming a district court decree requiring the defendant to supply services “at rates which are compensatory and under terms and conditions which are filed with and subject to approval by the Federal Power Commission”). In Otter Tail, the regulatory agency did not have the explicit statutory
authorization to mandate the antitrust remedy itself. Id. at 373-76. However, the
commission did have the capability to supervise and enforce such a remedy. Id.
273
Weiser, supra note 263, at 16.
274
Id. at 15.
275
Id. at 20.
269
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277

price charged by the former to the latter. A judicial remedy based
on a nondiscriminatory standard would require the broadband pro278
vider to charge Internet application companies the same rate.
Thus, in the context of broadband services and Internet applications (and the new economy generally), antitrust courts can effectively
counteract anticompetitive actions through a variety of remedial options.
CONCLUSION
Broadband providers compete directly with some Internet applications. Based on competition on the merits—for example, brand
power and bundled offerings—broadband providers often drive many
independent application providers from the market. However, the
proposed pay-to-play system is unreasonably tilting the competitive
Internet application landscape toward broadband providers’ control.
By imposing a passage fee on any time-sensitive application to ensure priority delivery, broadband providers would violate NN principles as well as the antitrust law. NN principles seek to create a structural bias favoring entry of any player into the market for Internet
applications. A pay-to-play system would impose significant barriers to
entry for Internet application companies that provide a time-sensitive
product. Thus, such a system would create a disincentive to innovate
on the most dynamic portion of the network: the “ends.”
Under Supreme Court precedent established in Aspen Skiing and
in Kodak, the pay-to-play system is effectively a refusal to deal with rivals. A monopolist’s action of closing a previously open platform
without a legitimate business justification may be grounds for antitrust
liability. Two of the three proffered justifications for the pay-to-play
policy—the prevention of free riding and a lack of economic incentive to exclude—are not “legitimate” under case law and economic
theory. The third justification offered—ensuring quality service—
though arguably pretextual, might constitute a business justification.
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A transfer price is the price at which one division of the company sells its product or service to another division of the company. See W. BRUCE ALLEN ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CASES 516 (6th ed. 2005) (describing
the meaning and importance of transfer pricing).
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An accountant can easily calculate the internal cost under the auspices of the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
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See Weiser, supra note 263, at 20 (“In practice, this often means identifying preferred customers—or internal division of its own operations—and ensuring that the
would-be-discriminated against party obtains the same treatment.”).
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Nonetheless, under a rule-of-reason analysis that balances procompetitive benefits with anticompetitive harms, the pay-to-play system
fails to withstand antitrust scrutiny. The same benefits could be attained in a manner that is less restrictive and harmful to competition.
In the next decade, consumers likely will witness greater competition in the provision of broadband services. The FCC has presently
taken a “lighter regulatory touch” in order to spur a market entry of
satellite, WiFi, 3G or 4G, and power line broadband to break up the
279
cable/DSL broadband duopoly.
In a marketplace that offers this
degree of consumer flexibility, a pay-to-play system would not be an
effective anticompetitive device.
However, the industry has not yet reached this competitive ideal.
DSL providers have signaled their desire to use their market power in
the last mile to extinguish their smaller VoIP rivals. Cable broadband
providers have the same incentives to crush an Internet application
that delivers video programming. In this period between deregulation and the competitive ideal, it is important to have a case-by-case
approach to address anticompetitive actions. Articulating an antitrust
framework for liability is crucial to maintaining innovation in the near
future.
Farrell and Weiser recommend that the FCC take an “antitrustlike” approach to regulation in order to avoid vertical competitive
280
harms before they occur.
Although this approach has significant
281
merit and could successfully implement the principles articulated in
this Comment, the FCC currently has taken a “lighter-touch” approach. Thus, in the absence of effective regulation, a clear articulation of potential antitrust liability for a pay-to-play system may deter
such future conduct. It is critical to articulate such liability in the
courts today.
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See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,222 (Oct. 17, 2005) (final rule) (indicating the FCC’s new
framework for wireline broadband Internet access service).
280
Farrell & Weiser, supra note 181, at 133.
281
For example, it would allow the FCC to articulate principles and provide businesses with valuable determinacy in a set of ground rules. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of Telecommunications Act of
1996, at 24 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03,
2003) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=707124 (describing the importance to
businesses of having determinate behavioral ground rules).

